A Brief History of America and the moros p2

A Brief History of America and the Moros

1899–1920 (continued) p. 2

The Bates Agreement (August 20, 1899)

The commanding officer of the American forces, Major General Elwell Otis, realized that he had not the resources to deal with two wars at the same time. He delegated the problem in to a newly-arrived field commander, Brigadier General John C. Bates. Bates was the well-educated son of Abraham Lincoln’s Attorney General and as a young man had fought with valor in every major battle of the Civil War fought by the Army of the Potomac. Otis demanded four things from Bates: 1) keep the Moros from joining the war in the north, 2) avoid a separate conflict, 3) gain recognition of U.S. sovereignty and acceptance of the stationing of U.S. troops, and (4) set up the framework for a longer-term relationship.

It was a delicate undertaking, fraught with risk to the greater American mission in the Philippines. Bates succeeded in only a few months. On August 20, 1899, the Bates Agreement was concluded between the United States, the Sultanate of Sulu. While smaller in land area than Mindanao, the Sulu Archipelago was the homeland of the powerful Tausugs and numerous Samals, the population epicenter of Moroland. In the agreement the U.S. would have the prerogatives and external responsibilities of a sovereign power over Sulu in exchange for defending its borders from foreign powers and promoting its trade and commerce. The American flag would fly above all others on buildings and on vessels. With it went the commensurate right to establish military garrisons and naval facilities, and move freely about the territory. In turn, the Moros were entitled to continue to govern themselves in their long-accustomed manner, through their traditional datus and headmen according to adat, their interpretation of Islamic Sharia law. Traditional property rights and ownership would be respected by the U.S. Moros would be judged by Moros in Moro courts according to Moro law. Americans or other nationalities charged with offenses would be judged in American courts under American law, while taking care to respect Moro law. Of greatest importance, the U.S. pledged it would not attempt to displace or interfere with the practice of the religion of Islam. This was the deal-breaker/deal-clincher for the Moro leadership. It was a unique arrangement of shared power.

By far the most difficult and touchy issue for both sides centered on slavery. The Moros believed enforced servitude was sanctioned by Islam. The Americans were but a little over one generation removed from having fought a cruel and wrenching civil war over the existence of slavery in their own country. In Article X of the Agreement, Bates proposed what he thought to be a pragmatic, reasonable, and acceptable compromise--a right of those in servitude to purchase their own freedom. His intention was that the manumission would be funded in its entirety by either the U.S. government or private philanthropy, in either way an almost inconsequential amount for the Americans. The concept had precedents: just prior to the Civil War Abraham Lincoln had proposed a “buy-out” scheme for slavery in order to head off southern secession and in nearby British controlled Borneo and Malaya, just such a scheme had ended an identical system. However as it would turn out, the issue of slavery was simply too toxic for either McKinley or the Congress to touch. The Bates Agreement was approved but without Article X, and became a political football, which eventually would be used to undermine and destroy the basis of the Bates Agreement.

The next challenge for Bates was to extend the range of the American presence to the next largest population grouping, the Maguindanaos of the vast Cotabato basin of central Mindanao and to wrest control of the Zamboanga Peninsula, and its large city away from the allies of the PRG. Time and sensibility dictated that Bates not get bogged down in having to conduct hundreds of separate negotiations and arrangements, with the possibility of conflicting interpretations. Instead he held up the Bates Agreement as a template, explaining its terms and implications and then asking each potentate for an up or down commitment to abide by its terms and spirit. With the Navy’s assistance, Bates set forth on a tireless traveling road show. In Zamboanga, an insurgency of the combined Moro and Chinese communities, supported by the US Navy gunboat Castine and two companies of the 23rd Infantry, toppled the Christian insurgents and drove them from the town.

As the world entered the new century in 1900, the Stars and Stripes flew over 70% of the Moro peoples and 80% of their land by a process of mutual assent. Pragmatically, Bates chose for the time being not to approach the most remote of the Moro peoples, the Maranaos, of the high, mountainous plains surrounding Lake Lanao. In addition to geography, the Maranaos were the least cohesive of the Moros; with literally hundreds of sultans, datus, and other titled headmen who were princes unto themselves. Historic hostility to the Christian communities on the north coast of Mindanao made it highly unlikely they would join in against the Americans or make trouble on their own. It was deemed better to let that sleeping dog lie.

Occupation of Moroland (1899-1903)

Despite later disparagement and revisionary history, the Bates Agreement permitted a relatively peaceful and mutually-beneficial four-year occupation for both sides. The US Army was able to take over the former Spanish outposts, establish new ones, and freely traverse through Sulu, Cotabato, and the coastal areas of Mindanao and Palawan without firing a shot. The U.S. Navy had free rein to patrol the Sulu Sea and even gained assistance from the British in nearby North Borneo; thereby effectively blockading Malaya-based gunrunners from exploiting “the backdoor of the Philippines.” The Moros not only stayed out of the Philippine-American War, but often assisted the Americans, permitting Bates’ successor, General William Kobbe, to use his very limited resources to defeat Christian “insurrectos” in northern Mindanao in 1901. Less than a half-dozen Americans and about thirty Moros died in incidents or altercations between the two parties. In sharp contrast to the bitter centuries long conflict between the Moros and the Empire of Spain, the relationship between occupier and occupied was tolerant, and occasionally outright friendly. In 1901 General Kobbe noted that small parties of Army surveyors regularly traveled unarmed and unhindered through miles of rough terrain, often greeted with warm hospitality by Muslim villagers.

In May of 1901 the 2nd Philippine Commission, headed by Judge William Howard Taft, visited Jolo, Zamboanga, and Cotabato as a part of a larger fact-finding mission in preparation for the installation of a civil government for the Philippines. At the same time word came that Aguinaldo had been captured and it was assumed that this event would bring the war to an almost immediate end (but it went on for more than another year). However, the Commission, and Judge Taft Came away uncertain that the Moros could ever fit into their greater scheme for the “civilizing” of the islands. In July a new civil government for the Philippines was proclaimed with Judge Taft at its head as the Governor General, but Moroland was pointedly excluded from being a part of the new arrangement.