Pershing's Lake Lanao Campaigns (1902-1903)

Pershing’s Lake Lanao Campaigns (1902-1903)

Several days after the Battle of Bayan, General Chaffee ordered Captain Pershing to meet him at Camp Vicars, an American outpost newly established on Lake Lanao near Bayan. Pershing was startled to be told he was being placed in “temporary command” of Camp Vicars, ostensibly a part of Baldwin’s command but in reality reporting directly to Chaffee through Davis. Even more surprising he, a mere Captain, would be given two troops of the 15th Cavalry, three companies of the 27th Infantry, the 25th Field Artillery Battery, engineers, and hospital corpsmen, about 700 men in all, to Pershing’s command. This gave him what amounted to an independent mini-army equal in size to half a regiment.

Pershing expressed skepticism, knowing only too well that giving a junior officer such an important command would invite intense jealousy and resentment from his peers and meddling from higher-ranking officers (he was right), but Chaffee pledged his full backing and support (from which he never wavered). Chaffee had selected Pershing for this unique assignment, not for his prior combat experience, which was negligible, but the good sense, skilled diplomacy, and personal courage he had demonstrated in convincing the vast majority of the Maranaos to stay on the sidelines. Chaffee shuddered at the thought of what might have happened had 20-30,000 Maranao warriors shown up on the battlefield instead. In Chaffee’s estimation the real hero of the battle was the man who had not even been there.

Pershing’s strategy at Lake Lanao has often been described by historians as one of divide and conquer, but the Moros, by the very nature of their societal institutions, were already divided. Rather, Pershing first focused his attention on sorting out who were his likely friends, who were his likely enemies, and who were somewhere in between. He sensed that at some point he would have to fight some of the most recalcitrant datus, but unlike Baldwin, he knew he could not fight everyone and must avoid at all costs making permanent enemies. Invitations went out to all the headmen at the south end of the lake to visit the camp, where they were received with great fanfare and gifts. Follow up visits were made to the home villages of those who visited. Pershing’s one year of command of Camp Vicars would consist of eleven months of diplomacy and two fortnights of fighting.

The first of the military campaigns was in September of 1902 against two known troublemakers not far away from Camp Vicars, Sultan Uali of Butig and the Sultan of Maciu. Pershing’s objective was to demonstrate that he could capture and destroy the typical Moro cotta (an earthen fort protected by deep moats and fields of sharpened bamboo stakes and cannon), which the Moros believed impregnable. And he intended to do it swiftly, efficiently, and at minimal cost. Considerable time and practice was devoted at Camp Vicars to devising new tactics and implements to deal with the difficulties of direct assaults on the formidable earthen fortresses. Of equal importance for Pershing was to demonstrate discipline and restraint; killing no more Moros than was absolutely necessary and rigorously avoiding damage to their civilian, as opposed to their “war,” property. He did not want to risk offending those who remained friendly or neutral and thereby turn them against him.

An expedition of 643 men departed Vicars September 18, 1902 against Butig and Maciu, returning October 3. One of the biggest problems it faced was an absence of decent maps and knowledge of the trail systems. Reckless heroics were discouraged. Small assault parties would rush the walls, but only to set fires and quickly retreat. Pershing wanted to avoid storming the forts until their defensive works had been clearly reduced. A frontal assault, when made, was kept deliberately slow and paced, with continual, but well-aimed, rifle and artillery fire, the objective being to pressure the Moro defenders to abandon the cottas, for which purpose escape routes were left open, creating as few martyrs as possible. Using these tactics, the expedition captured more than twenty cottas, large and small. Approximately fifty Moros were killed and fifty wounded during the campaign and several hundred other defenders fled. No Americans were killed and only two wounded. Afterwards, the defenses were torn up and their structures burned to the ground. Prisoners were paroled rather than incarcerated. Pershing made his point; exercising patience and the disciplined, controlled use of force could take the cottas at little cost.

But despite these successes, he was forced to curtail further military exercises for the next six months as a series of typhoons and the advent of the rainy season rendered the trails and river crossings impassible. This was followed by a devastating cholera outbreak and rinderpest (a livestock disease) that swept the Lake Lanao region, forcing men, horses, and mules to confine themselves to the camp. Then a major earthquake destroyed the few semi-permanent structures that had been built at Vicars. Through all these setbacks, however, Pershing kept up a regimen of direct meetings with datus and headmen and achieved considerable goodwill through treating opening up the camp hospital clinic to children who were cholera victims, sending teams to teach water purification, and helping to repair damaged houses and buildings. Pershing understood the key to his success was not the application of force but salesmanship; convincing the Maranao leadership that cooperating with or at least tolerating the American presence could serve their best interests.

On April 5, 1903 Pershing was finally able to resume his unfinished military business, leaving Camp Vicars with a fighting force of 512 officers and men for a two-stage “march” around Lake Lanao to confront the remaining intransigents. A letter in Maranao was sent to the datus along the route of march, identifying the intended route and making a simple proposition: if you wish to be our friends or simply stay neutral and not impede our way, fly an American flag or a white flag and we will leave you alone. If you intend to be enemies, fly a red flag (a flag of war to the Moros). Interestingly, most complied.

April 7 with red flags flying, two hundred men opposed Pershing’s small force from a formidable cotta at Bacolod. Moving into the surrounding hills above the lake, the Americans gained the heights, allowing the mountain guns to rain fire down on the fortification. Since it was thought likely that women and children were inside, Pershing designated a clear escape route, a safe zone where no one fleeing would be fired upon. Uppermost in Pershing’s mind was that at the end of his campaigns it would appear to the Moros that, by their definitions, he had fought both honorably and fair; and thereby avoiding entrapment in never-ending rounds of retribution and revenge-seeking. Of the estimated 200-plus Moros in the cotta, more than half chose to flee after the first day’s bombardment, most women and children. Only then was further exit cut off. The assault was launched the next morning and completed in only twenty minutes, after the climatic explosion of the defender’s main powder dump.

However, despite being outnumbered and outgunned, the defenders of Bacolod made a desperate fight to the death, and refused surrender. 120 Moros lay dead in the cotta and surrounding trenches, about half killed in the cannon and rifle barrage leading up to the final assault. Only eight Americans were wounded, and none were killed. A second lakeside cotta three miles away at Calahui surrendered after a day and night artillery bombardment and intense rifle fire killed 23 defenders and demoralized another 200 sufficiently to prompt a mass flight by boat and abandonment of the fort. Two dozen surrendered. Victory at the Battle of Bacolod, as both actions together came to be called, totaled 150 Moro dead at a cost of one American killed and fourteen wounded. Along the route of march, ten cottas had flown red flags in defiance, but white ones had waved from ninety-nine. The true extent of Pershing’s success was made evident just before his last foray. A prominent and formerly hostile Maranao holy man and a group of datus acclaimed Pershing a “datu” in a public ceremony. It was a show of respect for one who had respected their rules even while conquering them. He was the first (and only) American ever accorded that title.

On May 2, the expedition returned to Vicars to replenish manpower and supplies and then resume the march to circumnavigate the lake. A day later, 529 officers and men left Camp Vicars, marched east along the bottom of the lake and then turned north. Approaching the Taraca River, the cotta of a hostile datu named Ampuan-Agaus was found to be literally covered with red flags as well as a second large cotta at a nearby place called Pitacus. Both were assaulted and swiftly taken. During the assault on Pitacus 1st Lt. George C. Shaw of the 27th Infantry found himself suddenly alone, standing on a bamboo ladder and looking over the top of the parapet as two men beside him were knocked off by rifle fire. Fully exposed Shaw nevertheless held his precarious position, coolly returning fire, first with his .45-caliber revolver and when that was emptied by having his men pass him up rifle after rifle until other ladders could be placed and a wave of troops poured over the walls. For this marked act of courage, he would become the first man awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor in action against the Moros.

The earlier expeditions in the Fall of 1902 had initially received scant attention from the American press. But this had changed by the Spring of 1903, and his march around the lake was covered daily by thousands of newspapers. Following two tours in the Philippines totaling 3 ½ years, Captain Pershing returned to the U.S. in July of 1903 a hero.